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1 Introduction
Lobbying is commonly recognized as a public mechanism to induce policy makers
to follow the interests of well-organized groups. Therefore, lobbying is criticized
for distorting policies in favor of specific interests at the expense of society.
Nevertheless, such political influence activities can also be understood as a mech-
anism by which interest groups signal their policy preferences. That is, lobbying
conveys socially valuable information about the consequences of policies from
society to political agents. If better-informed political agents now choose policies
that increase social welfare, the provision of strategic information through lobbying
can outweigh the negative distortionary effects (Ball 1995 and literature cited
therein). Such arguments for the informational benefits of lobbying are also in
line with the so-called wisdom of the crowd hypothesis. The wisdom of the crowd
hypothesis suggests that a group of relatively uninformed individuals will collec-
tively have much more knowledge than will any single member of the group
(Galton 1907). Such a situation would enable political agents to choose better
policies if they receive individual information via communication in elite networks.
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The major factor determining whether the informational benefits in fact out-
weigh the distortionary costs is the structure of the political elite’s communication
network. An important issue here is the tradeoff between the efficient policy
learning of individual decisionmakers and a potential policy bias in the whole
network that induces negative effects on overall economic performance. Political
agents learn efficiently about the impacts of policy decisions on the economic
system if they choose communication partners similar in political interests to
themselves. Festinger (1954) argues that similar others offer relevant information
and that similarity in interests is a well-known determinant of, for instance,
friendship. In terms of policy learning, having communication ties with organiza-
tions that have similar interests to oneself reduces biased information signals and
allows for an individually efficient communication process. However, such indi-
vidually rational information-gathering routines also lead to policy distortions in
favor of the group with the same interests as the political decisionmakers.
We suggest an empirical approach allowing for quantitative analysis of the
informational value and the distorting nature of real-world knowledge diffusion
within a country’s political elite.1 Theoretical and observational studies suggest that
political actors choose ties with others in a rational and predictable manner (Car-
penter et al. 1998, 2004). In particular, the study tackles the following set of
questions in order to provide valuable information for designing evidence-based
policy formulation processes. Is the network-generating process individually or
globally efficient, i.e., is it not distorted in favor of special interests with regard to
policy learning? Do structural factors, similar political views, or the level of an
alter’s expertise determine the choice of contact? Do individual levels of political
expertise lead to higher connectivity with other organizations?
We address these questions based on data collected via a series of face-to-face
interviews with Malawi’s political elite in 2010. This survey has already been
described in detail in Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participa-
tory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi” of this volume. The
methodological challenge in assessing determinants of elite communication net-
works with survey data is dealing soundly with missing data. Despite the highest
efforts in fieldwork, survey data is almost inevitably subject to item and unit
non-response. Our estimation strategy addresses the mentioned data features by
adapting the Bayesian estimation scheme for binary probit models based on the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology, namely Gibbs sampling, as
suggested by Albert and Chib (1993). Based on a sample from the posterior
distribution of the model parameters, obtained via iterative sequential sampling
from the full conditional distributions, parameter estimates are given as sample
moments. This estimation technique, using the device of data augmentation pro-
posed by Tanner and Wong (1987), is well suited to deal with missing values in
1We focus on expert information networks because our main interest lies in understanding
information-gathering routines of a country’s elite. Studying determinants of political support
networks and evaluating the nature of non-informative lobbying is left.
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explaining factors and missing values within the dependent network relationship.
The vector of model parameters subject to posterior inference is augmented to also
include the missing values of explaining variables and missing network relation-
ships, where draws for the missing values within explaining factors are then
obtained via sequential regression trees, providing non parametric approximations
of the underlying full conditional distributions (Burgette and Reiter 2010). The
proposed modeling thereby accounts for the uncertainty within parameter estima-
tion due to missing values, as discussed in Butts (2003). We provide a model fitness
criterion that allows for gauging the predictive capability of the suggested empirical
framework and comparison of non-nested model specifications.
Empirical results suggest that common meeting opportunities and political
influence are important determinants of the probability of observing a tie between
a pair of organizations, while knowledge is an important but not leading determi-
nant of communication. There is no evidence that information diffusion is affected
by interest bias in Malawi. In terms of designing a political communication process,
the results suggest that supporting umbrella organizations should increase informa-
tion flow in the elite network.
This chapter proceeds as follows. We first describe determinants of political
communication and corresponding empirical data. Next, we introduce the estima-
tion strategy and the approach to model comparison. This is followed by study
results and conclusions.
2 Determinants of Political Communication Networks
In this section, we first review determinants of elite communication structures as
typically discussed in literature on political influence of interest groups and social
network formation. Next, we provide a description of the variables used to assess
empirically the determinants of communication.
2.1 Theoretical Considerations
Models used to describe the evolution of ties within networks commonly fall into
two groups: preference-driven models and structure-driven models. To accommo-
date both approaches, we propose three main categories of determinants of political
communication: (i) homophily in political interests, (ii) political knowledge or
expertise, and (iii) structural factors (see Fig. 1). The first two categories rely
upon the preference-driven approach to explain tie formation, while the third
category summarizes the structural constraints organizations face in making
contacts.
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With regard to the first two categories, it is important to consider the two main
roles of lobbying, i.e. informing and distorting. Several studies argue for the
informational role of lobbying based on theoretical derivations from signaling
games (Austen-Smith 1993; Ball 1995; Lohmann 1993). They emphasize that
politicians are better able to choose efficient policies if they are being lobbied.
Thus, it is rational for political agents to contact nongovernmental organizations
with high expertise in a specific policy domain in order to reduce the uncertainty
inherent in policy choices. For example, a political goal of agricultural policy is to
achieve food security. Based on the dominance of knowledge in tie choice,
policymakers should seek advice from organizations with high expert knowledge
on, e.g., how a fertilizer subsidy affects food production, household income, and
food prices, in order to launch goal-oriented policies.
With regard to expertise as a driver of nongovernmental–nongovernmental
relations, consider that expert information is costly and not always publicly avail-
able. Nevertheless, an organization’s influence on the beliefs of decisionmakers
depends primarily on the organization’s expertise. Therefore, an organization has
the incentive to invest in contact making with experts to reduce uncertainty in their
policy beliefs and to increase their reputation as well-informed communication
partners.
However, getting informed comes with a price, according to lobbying theories.
Information is seldom unbiased and mostly reflects an organization’s position,
which is biased according to political interests. This bias component leads to policy
distortions at the expense of the public interest, if interests are not represented
equally. Additionally, it determines a political actor’s information-gathering rou-
tines. The latter results from the fact that receiving information from sources
with similar interests to oneself lowers the likelihood of receiving information
that does not match one’s own interests in the state of the world (Festinger 1954;
Fig. 1 Determinants of network evolution. Source: Authors
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Austen-Smith 1993).2 Accordingly, communicating with organizations with similar
political interests reduces the fiscal, emotional and processing costs of policy
learning. It becomes rational for individuals to systematically choose alters that
are similar in interests. Therefore, a commonly accepted determinant of tie choice,
homophily, can also be applied to understand policy network evolution (for exper-
imental evidence on political homophily as a driver of tie choice, see Knoke (1990),
Pappi and Henning (1999), andMoody (2001).3 In summary, political homophily as
a determinant of political communication lowers the likelihood of biased signals for
the receiver of information but, assuming an unequal representation of interests and
a negative correlation between knowledge and bias, increases the probability of
biased, low-value information diffusion in the overall network.
Structural approaches argue that contact opportunities influence an actor’s ties.
Consider overlapping membership in organizations as well as formal and perceived
political influence and human resources as structural determinants of communica-
tion choices. Theoretical arguments for overlapping membership in organizations
as determinant are twofold. First, we lean onMcPherson et al. (2001), who point out
that meeting opportunity determines the formation of friendships in school. Trans-
ferring this idea to political communication, membership in umbrella organizations
or common membership in organizations, as indicators for meeting opportunities,
increases the probability that a pair of organizations forms a communication tie. At
the same time, a common worldview might determine membership in an (umbrella)
organization and thereby increase the trust an organization has in the information of
other organizations with the same memberships. That is, an organization will seek
information from another organization if a third party links them both (Holland and
Leinhardt 1971).4
Another important determinant is an organization’s power to influence legisla-
tion (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Knoke et al. 1996). Given the purpose of
lobbying as an interest-mediation mechanism, lobbying organizations contact
highly influential actors within the political elite in order to ensure that their
members benefit from final policy decisions. We therefore expect that the higher
the perceived influence of an actor receiving information is in a specific policy
domain, the more likely it is that organizations will contact this actor. We choose
perceived influence and not formal political power for two main reasons. First, we
argue in line with Shepsle and Weingast (1987) that formal institutional rules
cannot explain observed power distributions. With regard to developing countries,
2Austen-Smith and Wright argue for the contrary effect of preference similarity in tie creation.
Interest groups, i.e. organizations try to contact organizations with whom they disagree in order to
convince them.
3On the concept of homophily in network evolution theories, see Lazer et al. (2008), McPherson
et al. (2001) or Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995).
4The informational efficiency model contradicts the idea that a common link to a third party
increases the likelihood of information exchange between a pair of organizations. On the contrary,
this model states that organizations will drop ties to organizations with whom they are linked by a
third party due to information redundancies (Carpenter et al. 2004).
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consider also the work of Bratton (2007), who argues that the rule of law is often
weakly developed even if it is not completely absent in developing countries.
Political power tends to be intensely concentrated around the president, and as a
result his cabinet becomes more powerful in policymaking (van der Walle 2003).
Further, considering only formal political power would dismiss the informal influ-
ence of international organizations in developing countries. Second, we argue that
using perceived influence instead of formal power will not bias results. Formal
political power usually is highly correlated with the perceived influence of actors
endowed with formal power. Moreover, employing the concept of perceived influ-
ence has the advantage of reflecting both informal and formal political power
distributions with one measure.
Finally, consider networking time as a scare resource of an organization, as
hiring and paying staff is cost intensive and budgets are usually constrained. Given
the time-consuming nature of forming and maintaining relationships, the number of
staff, therefore, determines the contact opportunities that exist between a pair of
organizations (Carpenter et al. 1998, 2004).
In summary, theoretical considerations offer two insights on the evaluation of
participatory policy processes. First, as network formation can be preference-
driven, bias in favor of a specific group can occur and resulting policy decisions
will be at the expense of the public. Nevertheless, expertise can be a major
determinant of tie formation, as all actors seek to reduce uncertainty inherent to
policy belief formation. Second, according to structuralist approaches, exogenous
actors can influence the network structure by means of increasing meeting oppor-
tunities, e.g., joining umbrella organizations and increasing the number of staff.
2.2 Empirical Determinants of Communication
According to our theoretical considerations, our set of empirical variables is
differentiated into three classes: (i) variables describing political homophily,
(ii) variables indicating individual knowledge, and (iii) variables related to struc-
tural factors. For further information on the study that collected data for these
variables, see Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory
Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”.
Political Homophily We approximate political homophily by a distance index of
political interests (distance). Such an index provides dyad-specific information on
the probability of observing communication between elite members due to simi-
larity in policy interests. The index summarizes the distances in interest between
two actors concerning the preferred dimension of the state of the world. We selected
eight dimensions for representing the state of the world that actors address with
designing agricultural policy programs (see Table 1). The index is calculated as a
Euclidean distance function based on the policy interests of actor i and actor j in
dimension X(z) with z¼1,..,8:
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distanceij ¼
X8
z¼1
X
zð Þ
i  X zð Þj
 2
ð1Þ
Official policy documents provide the basis to extract the dimensions of the state
of the world in a respective country. In the case of Malawi, consider the Malawi
Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) and the Agriculture Sector Wide
Approach (ASWAp) as important policy programs (Government of Malawi 2006,
The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi 2010). Table 1
describes which policy interests evolve in society that drive political behavior
according to these two major policy documents. Interests are listed in descending
order of average interest over interviewed organizations. Further, Table 1 lists
common interests and conflicting positions that occur within one specific dimension
of the state of the world. While common interests will drive political homophily and
thereby communication, conflicting positions increase the potential for policy
deadlocks but allow also for policy learning. Consider, for example, the welfare
of smallholders. Actors might be equally interested in reducing hunger and malnu-
trition but have different experiences and information about the political strategy to
reach their common aim. One actor might favor input subsidies to increase maize
yields, the other one might consider budget spending on extension services as a
more efficient policy strategy. Information exchange between these two actors can
help to choose a strategy that best fits their common interests.
Knowledge Our strategy to identify an organization’s level of knowledge is two-
fold. First, as knowledge is hardly observable, we use the age of the organization
Table 1 Description of interests: state of the world
Dimension Common interests Conflicting positions Ø interest
Welfare:
smallholders
Reduce hunger and
malnutrition
Political market interventions 21
Poverty reduction Poverty reduction Achievable poverty level
(short-term)
18
Welfare: agr.
export sector
Foreign currency earnings Political market intervention 14
Budget Development of the
agricultural sector
Share of agr. budget in total
budget
13
Environmental
sustainability
Conservation of natural
resources
Budget priority of environmen-
tal sustainability
12
Gender issues Lessen the vulnerability
of the poor
Gender specific policy
programs
10
Welfare: non-agr.
industry
Economic growth Political market intervention 6
Welfare: urban
consumers
Food provision to urban
population
Level of food prices 5
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi (2010), Government
of Malawi (2006), own data
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(age) and the organization’s degree of specialization in agriculture (specialization)
to approximate political knowledge. In our study, age equals 2000 minus year of
foundation, and specialization relates to an organization’s effort spent on agricul-
tural issues.
Second, we use an alternative indicator that directly measures the technological
knowledge of actors regarding the transformation of CAADP policies into policy
outcomes based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. In particular,
Henning (2012) models the impact of different CAADP policies on the eight
relevant policy concerns within an extended CGE approach calibrated for Malawi.
As described in detail in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating participatory
policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi” of this
volume, based on this CGE approach, the optimal CAADP policy positions from
the viewpoint of different governmental and nongovernmental organizations can be
identified—where optimality involves maximizing the organizations’ political sup-
port functions—while modeling the technical translation of CAADP policies into
policy concerns evolves according to the extended CGE. Comparing the theoreti-
cally derived optimal policy positions with the policy positions stated by organi-
zations during our interview implies a measure of an organizations’ political
knowledge. In particular, Henning (2012) calculates the Euclidean difference
between the theoretically implied and empirically stated policy position (see
Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi”). We use this measure as a direct indicator
of the political knowledge of an organization (expertise) in our econometric
analysis. As documented in detail in Chapter “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”,
on average, farm and civil society organizations have the highest political knowl-
edge, while politicians and, in particular, political parties have the lowest political
knowledge. Donor organizations take a middle ground in political knowledge.
Structural Factors Because the perception of an organization as influential in
policymaking will influence its probability of forming ties, we use a reputation
network for identifying an organization’s political reputation (reputation). This
variable will further serve as a proxy of an organization’s legislative power. Please
note that reputation is highly correlated with the lobbying power calculated in
Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi” based on simulated support network data.
To account for the meeting opportunities between two organizations, we include the
number of staff working on agricultural policy issues (staff) in our analysis.
Information about organizational membership allows us to calculate a dyad-specific
count variable that indicates how often two organizations were members of the
same umbrella organization (same). Examples of umbrella organizations in Malawi
are the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) and the Civil Society Agricul-
ture Network (CISANET).We include the determinants as dyad-specific character-
istics into our econometric model, i.e., sender- and receiver-specific individual
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variables are transformed into pair-wise distances. In addition, the individual
determinants enter the model as sender- and receiver-specific variables.
Since homophily is a key term of interest in this analysis, we calculate Euclidean
distance measures between sender- and receiver-specific values of specialization,
age, staff, reputation and policy concerns (distance). The larger the values of these
distance measures, the more organizations differ in terms of the respective issue. A
negative value of the parameter estimate indicates that the probability of forming a
tie increases with homophily in the respective dimension. A positive value suggests
that heterophily has positive impacts on the probability of communication.
3 Study Design and Econometric Model Framework
3.1 Study Design
Identified relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations are reported
in Table A1 in the appendix. While Chapter “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”
describes the study design in detail and presents the data collected from parts (a),
policy network data, and (b), policy preferences of the policy network survey
conducted in Malawi, data collected from part (c) of the questionnaire is described
below.
First, however, we explain the measurement of political homophily (distance) in
more detail, as this variable is important within the analysis of network formation.
Given our theoretical framework, political homophily relates to an organization’s
interests in specific policy concerns. Hence, in this study we use the interview data
from the questions about interest, X
zð Þ
i in the eight policy concerns, i.e. z ¼ 1,. . .,8.
Interests are ascertained by distributing 100 points across the eight dimensions of
the state of world (identified in Table 1). For information on the data used to
calculate expertise, please see Chapters “Modeling and Evaluation of Political
Processes: A New Quantitative Approach” and “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”.
Part (c) of the survey asks questions about organizational attributes that inform
about an organization’s degree of specialization in agriculture (specialization), the
year of foundation (to calculate age), and the number of staff engaged in agricul-
tural issues (staff). Further, we asked organizations to name all umbrella organiza-
tions of which they are a member. With this information in hand, we calculate the
dyad-specific count variable same, which informs about overlapping memberships
in umbrella organizations between a pair of organizations. The mean of this
variable reveals that, on average, two organizations in Malawi are jointly members
of 1.3 organizations.
Summary statistics for all exogenous variables under consideration are given in
Table 2.
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3.2 Econometric Model
We design an empirical model capturing key elements of the communication
process between local elite members related to individual characteristics influenc-
ing the formation probability of a network tie. Individual characteristics are con-
sidered as important network determinants in terms of the prevailing homophily of
network agents. For analyzing the process which establishes communication ties δji
or δij between local elite members i¼ 1 , . . . , n and j¼ 1 , . . . , n with i 6¼ j for the
considered directed dichotomous network relationships, determinants of commu-
nication relationships are assessed within a probit framework, i.e. δij¼ 1, if δ∗ij > 0
and δij¼ 0 else. Following Hoff and Ward (2004), the latent variable δ∗ij relating
determinants of communication with the observed network tie δij is thereby param-
eterized as
δij
∗ ¼ Wijβ þWiκs þWiκr þ hij þ eij ¼ Qijθ þ eij, ð2Þ
where Wij is a set of dyad specific variables, Wi denotes a set of sender specific
characteristics for individual i, Wj is a set of receiver specific characteristics for
individual j. hij is assumed to capture distance effects and thus homophily and is
hence parameterized in such a way to allow the aggregation of individual specific
characteristics to the dyadic level, i.e.
hij ¼j Wi Wj j γ, ð3Þ
and θ¼ {β, κs, κr, γ} summarizes all model parameters. Using a probit link, which
corresponds to the assumption of a standard normal distribution for the latent error,
i.e. eij ~N(0, 1), allows for establishing a Bayesian estimation routine facilitated by
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. Parameter inference within a
Bayesian setup is performed based on the posterior distribution defined via
p θjdatað Þ / L datajθð Þπ θð Þ, ð4Þ
Table 2 Summary statistics Variable Mean SD
Specialization 0.652 0.305
Age 26.027 20.288
Staff 19.625 34.753
Reputation 0.573 0.179
Same 1.267 0.708
Distance 0.314 0.146
Expertise 0.641 0.177
Source: Calculated by authors from own data
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where L(data| θ) denotes the model likelihood and π(θ) the assumed prior distribu-
tion of model parameters. Parameter inference is based on moments and quantiles
of the posterior distribution. These are obtained on the basis of sample trajectories
drawn from the posterior distribution. Sampling of parameters from their joint
posterior distribution is achieved via iterative sampling from the full conditional
distributions. The model likelihood is then given as
L datajθð Þ ¼
Y
i 6¼j
Φ 2δij  1
 
Qijθ
  
, ð5Þ
whereΦ() denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Given the
above model structure, we adapt conjugate priors for all model parameters, i.e. a
multivariate normal prior for parameter vector θ with the corresponding mean set to
zero and diagonal covariance with variance set to 100 for each element. More
details on Bayesian estimation via Gibbs sampling for this kind of models are given
in Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2011). Next to parameter estimates, interpretation
of results is provided by calculation of marginal effects, where the corresponding
uncertainty is directly accessibly by means of the Gibbs output, see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for a more general discussion.
In addition, the use of Bayesian estimation allows for a conceptually straight-
forward treatment of missing values within both, the observed network relationship
and the explaining variables. As empirical network data is most often based on
personal interviews and survey data, missing values occur despite tremendous
effort in fieldwork and questionnaire design. Missing values are especially trouble-
some, as a single missing value for a considered explaining characteristic for
individual i causes the potential loss of n 1 observed network relationships for
assessing the link between the formation probability of a network tie and the
considered individual characteristics as determinants thereof. Additionally, the
parameter estimates would no longer reflect information on all network constitu-
ents. Thus proper estimation routines facilitating the use of variables with single
missing observations are needed to perform proper statistical analysis incorporating
the uncertainty in parameter estimation stemming from missing values. Dealing
with missing values is performed using the MCMC device of data augmentation as
suggested by Tanner and Wong (1987). The parameter vector θ is augmented to
include the missing values in the explaining factors. Sampling from the full
conditional distributions for these missing values is then incorporated within the
iterative sampling scheme providing draws from the posteriori distribution p(θ|
data). For the considered probit model allowing for analysis of a directed dependent
network relationship, the sampling proceeds by iterating the following basic steps,
see Albert and Chib (1993).
1. Sampling of the latent variable δij
∗ from truncated normal distributions with
means given by the linear regression setup and variance of one. The truncation at
zero from above is δij¼ 0 and from below if δij¼ 1, see Aßmann and Boysen-
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Hogrefe (2011) for details on the corresponding moments of this full conditional
distribution.
2. Sampling of the parameters β , κs , κr and γ from full conditional distributions
underlying the linear regression setup for latent variable δij
∗, see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for details on the corresponding moments of this full
conditional distribution.
3. Sampling from the full conditional distributions of missing values.
a. In case of missing values in one of the explaining variables, these are obtained
using non-parametric approximations for the full conditional distributions as
suggested by Burgette and Reiter (2010). Note that for this class of empirical
network models, where the set of individual characteristics is assumed to
explain the formation probability of a network tie, only few observations are
at hand to provide a realistic approximation of the full conditional distribu-
tion. If the number of observations required by the non-parametric approach
of Burgette and Reiter (2010) is not reached, draws for the missing values are
obtained from the observed unconditional distribution as the only approxi-
mation of the full conditional distribution at hand to obtain draws for this
variables.
b. In case of missing values in the dependent variable, sampling from a binary
distribution with success probability ϕ(Qijθ) yields a draw from the full
conditional distribution.
Successive sampling from the outlined full conditional distributions establishes
a sample from the posterior distribution facilitating inference with regard to param-
eters based on the empirical moments. Although parameter estimates allow for
direct assessment of the direction in which explaining factors influence the forma-
tion probability of a communication tie, marginal effects provide a quantification of
the effect of a change in determining factors on the probability of a communication
relation. Marginal effects are conceptually given as
∂Pr δij¼1~Qð Þ
∂~Q
, where ~Q denotes a
particular state of the considered control variables, e.g., the mode. An estimate of
the marginal effects is readily obtained from the output of the Gibbs sampling
scheme as
1
S
Xn
i¼1
ϕ ~Qθ sð Þ
 
θ sð Þ, ð6Þ
where ϕ() denotes the standard normal density and θ(s), s¼ 1 , . . . , S, denote the
sampled trajectories of all considered model parameters. In general estimates will
be based on 10000 draws, i.e., S¼ 10000, where discarding the initial 2000 draws
have been found sufficient to mitigate the effect of burn-in.
However, whilst the necessity to deal with missing values within the explaining
factors is inherent given the considered empirical network model for the surveyed
network data, it is nevertheless important to check carefully the adequacy of the
considered empirical model. While valid point and interval estimates are readily
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available for the above suggested approach for dealing with missing values, other
standard measures for gauging model fitness, like e.g. F tests, are not readily
available. Note that this applies also to alternative approaches allowing for handling
of missing data, see Raghunathan et al. (2001). As a natural approach to gauge
model fitness is based on the capability of the empirical network model to provide
accurate forecasts, the following outlines one possibility to calculate an overall
measure of model fitness. The situation of a network observed with missing values
poses a methodological challenge, as the benchmark for assessing the prediction
accuracy, i.e. the true relationship between network members, remains
unobservable. As a formal prediction criteria, we use the area under the curve
(AUC) measure derived from the receiver operator characteristics (ROC) curve
approach proposed by Egan (1975). In order to function as a valid criterion of
model fitness, the AUC measure has to be combined with a pseudo out-of-sample
experiment gauging against possible overparameterization, see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for a review of this approach in cross validation experi-
ments for binary panel data. One possibility to design the out-of-sample is to split
the network constituents into four quarters forming a partition of the set of network
constituents, where other splits are also possible. Parameter estimation is based on
the network formed by three quarters of the network constituents, where parameter
estimates are then used to predict the network formed by the left quarter of network
constituents. Adapting a fourfold split yields a total of four possible combinations.
Since in our situation the underlying network involves missing data, the predicted
network resulting from complete sample estimation serves as a prediction refer-
ence. Note that this approach allows for a comparison of even non-nested model
specifications.
4 Empirical Results
Estimation results concerning the explanatory factors suggested by theory are
provided in Table 3 below. Although parameter estimates show the direction in
which explanatory factors influence the probability of tie formation between two
organizations, regression coefficients (columns 3 and 4) provide no correct quan-
titative description of the relationship between the probability of communication
ties and changes within the explanatory factors. The relative importance of the
different explanatory factors can be gauged based on marginal effects (columns
6 and 7). The in-sample AUC measure reveals that our approach to dealing with
missing values and the suggested model specification result in high prediction
accuracy of communication ties between organizations. Using the random graph
model as an illustrative benchmark (corresponding AUC measure of 0.5), the out-of
sample AUC measures point to the significantly increased prediction accuracy due
to the considered set of explaining factors.
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4.1 Homophily in Interests and Other Determinants
In Table 3, estimated parameters and marginal effects show that homophily in an
organization’s attributes increases the probability that it will interact. All significant
variables have a negative sign. If organizations are similar in terms of specializa-
tion, staff, and reputation, the probability of forming a tie increases. Inspection of
the marginal effects reveals no high quantitative effect of an increase in the
difference of staff between two organizations on the probability of forming a
communication tie, while increasing homophily in reputation and specialization
has a high quantitative impact. These findings point at the need to look not only at
parameter estimates but also at marginal effects to assess the quantitative effects
correctly. We find no significance for homophily in age or expertise.
Table 3 Estimation results (dependent variable is: if A! B, tie ¼ 1; 0 otherwise)
Parameter estimates Marginal effects
Mean SD 2.50% 97.50% Mean SD
Constant 1.254 0.468 2.185 0.341 – –
Homophily
Specialization 0.672 0.201 1.068 0.281 0.223 0.065
Age 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.000 0.001
Expertise 0.423 0.372 0.315 1.147 0.144 0.128
Staff 0.01 0.003 0.016 0.004 0.003 0.001
Reputation 0.949 0.346 1.619 0.266 0.316 0.116
Distance 0.41 0.366 0.295 1.141 0.142 0.129
Structural
Same 0.814 0.116 0.585 1.043 0.274 0.054
Sender-specific
Specialization 0.3 0.246 0.776 0.189 0.105 0.087
Age 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.001
Expertise 1.593 0.392 2.329 0.786 0.53 0.128
Staff 0.02 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.001
Reputation 0.241 0.336 0.413 0.896 0.078 0.111
Receiver-specific
Specialization 0.339 0.17 0.005 0.662 0.111 0.054
Age 0.007 0.003 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.001
Expertise 0.062 0.293 0.517 0.642 0.023 0.099
Staff 0.02 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.001
Reputation 4.591 0.325 3.93 5.23 1.539 0.191
Predicted (rows)/Observed (columns) 0 1
0 240 43
1 429 620
AUC (in-sample/out-of-sample) 0.7262/0.6724
Source: Calculated by authors from own data
226 C. Aßmann et al.
Political homophily (distance) is not an important determinant of communica-
tion. With regard to the distortionary effects of political homophily, this finding
suggests less biased policy decisions. Nevertheless, organizations need to adopt
efficient information-processing routines to filter received information in terms of a
sender’s special-interest bias.
4.2 Knowledge
Next, we take a closer look at knowledge as a determinant of tie formation. We start
with the proxy for an organization’s level of knowledge: specialization. A
receiver’s probability of gaining information by communication increases with its
level of specialization. A sender’s level of specialization is not significantly
associated with tie formation. The negative and significant sign of the difference
in specialization implies that communication partners are likely to be similar in
their level of specialization and thereby in their level of knowledge. With regard to
expertise transmission in the network, this result points at isolated clusters of
knowledge that prohibit the spread of knowledge, where receivers are already
well informed about policy impacts.
Age as another proxy reveals that the younger an organization, the higher the
probability of receiving information from others. If we now put great age on a high
level with knowledge, the process enables transmission of knowledge from the
long-established, more experienced organizations to the younger and less experi-
enced ones. Please note that similarity in age does not significantly prohibit tie
formation.
As these variables are at best proxies for knowledge, we consider a further
advanced indicator expertise, which is derived from our own survey data and
Malawi’s CGE. Note that low values of expertise indicate a high level of knowledge
about impacts of policy decisions on the state of the world. A sender’s high value
for expertise is especially associated with a greater probability of communication.
Since homophily in expertise has no significant impact on the probability of
forming a communication tie, knowledge will not circulate within a cluster of
highly informed organizations. Consequently, less-informed organizations are
able to receive information from experts ceteris paribus, and well-informed policy
decisions are likely to happen.
We summarize for knowledge as a determinant of communication that young
organizations receive information from older ones and that knowledge is spread
among organizations with divergent levels of knowledge. In fact, the marginal
effect of sender-specific expertise states that knowledge highly influences the
probability of senders to form ties. However, if specialization in agriculture is
well correlated with knowledge, homophily in specializationwould prohibit knowl-
edge transmission. In our case, we observe the contrary. Specialization is not highly
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correlated with expertise (correlation equals 0.069). Hence, we suggest discussing
the variable specialization more generally in terms of an organization’s main
activity field. That is, organizations with heterogeneous activity fields but high
capacity can still be well-informed organizations. Good cases in point are donor
organizations. It is well recognized that donors rarely specialize in a sector but
handle several problem areas in a developing country. With this example in mind,
the negative impact of homophily in specialization does not trigger information
transmission but simply reveals that organizations with similar activity fields will
form ties more often ceteris paribus.
4.3 Structural Factors
Turning now to structural factors as determinants of communication, we observe
several significant variables. One factor that determines an organization’s proba-
bility of participating in elite communication is the number of staff (staff). This
finding is in line with other studies, see for instance Carpenter et al. (2004). For
senders and receivers an increase in the number of staff increases their probability
of communicating with others. We again observe homophily among organizations.
That is, organizations of about the same size are more likely to communicate with
each other. However, inspection of the marginal effects reveals no high quantitative
effect of an increase in the number of staff or in the difference of staff between a
pair of organizations on the probability of communicating.
A receiver’s perceived influence (reputation) appears to increase the probability
that actors will contact highly influential others. Consider here that reputation is
highly correlated with formal and informal political power. The result is intuitive,
since it suggests that senders try to increase the probability that legislation will
favor their interests by providing expert information to highly influential organiza-
tions. The observed marginal effect of receiver-specific reputation reveals a great
influence of this determinant on network evolution. The negative sign on the
difference in reputation suggests that organizations similar in reputation form
communication clusters. Consequently, less influential organizations are less likely
to form ties to powerful actors.
Another determinant of communication is overlapping membership in umbrella
organizations between a pair of organizations (same). The more umbrella organi-
zations are connecting A to B, the more likely organization A is to communicate
with organization B. Inspection of marginal effects reveals a high quantitative
impact of overlapping membership in umbrella organizations on the probability
of communicating. This finding is in line with the theoretical considerations.
Common membership in umbrella organizations increases the trust between orga-
nizations and thereby increases the probability that the two exchange information.
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Further, common membership is a proxy for the opportunity structure to meet and
communicate.5
5 Discussion
Based on the empirical assessment, we conclude that overlapping membership in
organizations and political influence are more important determinants of elite
communication ties than knowledge in Malawi. We do not infer that knowledge
can be neglected as a determinant or that an elite network does not spread infor-
mation among actors. However, the high marginal effects of same and homophily in
reputation narrow the impact of knowledge on tie formation, even if expertise
significantly influences the probability of sending information. For illustration, the
following calculations are performed to describe how overlapping membership in
organizations (same) and their level of knowledge (expertise) influence the proba-
bility of forming a tie for senders. In fact, we calculate the effect of a change in
same (expertise) from the minimum value to the maximal value observed in our
sample. Therefore, probabilities to communicate are computed for each of the two
determinants at these extreme positions averaging over all other determinants
observed within the sample. The minimum of same corresponds to no overlapping
organizations, the maximum to four overlapping organizations. The minimum level
of knowledge is given by a value of 1.098 for expertise in our sample, while a value
of 0.445 for expertise denotes the highest level of knowledge among the actors.6 An
inspection of effects, see Table 4, reveals that increasing overlapping membership
in organizations increases the probability of observing a tie between a pair of
organizations by 29%. However, if an uninformed sender gains as much knowledge
as the best-informed actor in the sample, the probability of forming ties, with all
other determinants fixed at their means except homophily in expertise, increases by
22 percentage points. Hence, joining other organizations would be ceteris paribus a
better means than accumulating knowledge to increase the probability of sending
information.
In terms of the bias/information tradeoff of participatory policy processes,
results show that political homophily is not a significant determinant of communi-
cation. Therefore, at least regarding fundamental policy concerns, participatory
policy processes allow for unbiased information diffusion in Malawi. However, two
qualifications of this result are necessary. First, although political homophily does
5Please note that literature suggests that homophily in attributes might affect the opportunity
structure to meet (see Lazer et al. 2008). We leave it to future work to disentangle the effect of
meeting opportunity and homophily in interests and remind the reader to interpret the results
carefully. Nevertheless, we think that our detailed measure of political homophily is neither
correlated with overlapping membership in organizations nor affected by the same factors as the
latter. Therefore, our estimations are not plagued by endogeneity or multicollinearity.
6Please note that we measure political knowledge via the Euclidian distance between stated and
optimal policy position of an organization, i.e. the higher the distance the lower the knowledge.
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not play a role, homophily in general is still an important structural determinant of
the network-generating process of political communication among Malawi’s polit-
ical elite. In particular, homophily in reputation as well as in specialization clearly
discriminates communication between types of organizations. For example, our
estimation results imply that, based on reputational homophily, international donor
organizations have a significant higher probability of sending information to central
ministries, i.e., the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food Security (MoAFS), when compared to an average national civil society
organization. Second, despite homogeneous interests in fundamental policy con-
cerns, heterogeneity of preferred policy positions among organizations can still
result due to biased political beliefs. Hence, to limit policy biases due to wrong
beliefs it is important that communication ties are determined by the political
knowledge of the sender. Here, the strong marginal effect for sender-specific
political knowledge certainly works in favor of unbiased political beliefs, but
overall this effect is alleviated by structural factors as well as homophily effects
determining the network-generating process. Thus, overall, only suboptimal polit-
ical communication structures result.
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the communication patterns among governmental, local stake-
holder and international organizations in Malawi. We present an approach that is
novel within network estimation as well as within political science. In terms of
econometric analysis of surveyed network data, our approach is based on an
extended binary regression framework. In fact, the model relies on a Bayesian
estimation framework to handle missing data due to survey non-response. For
political consultants, the framework enables learning about political communica-
tion processes in a country. Findings will enable them to design communication
processes that increase the probability of well-informed, unbiased policy choices.
In addition to this, we explicitly analyze the information/distortion potential of
participatory policy processes by employing two variables. First, we use an external
measure of an actor’s knowledge about policy impacts derived from a CGE model
and survey data of the actor’s policy preferences in order to analyze the impact of
the actor’s knowledge on its probability of communicating with others. Second, we
employ an index of homophily in policy interests between a pair of organizations to
Table 4 Simulation of
marginal effects: same and
expertise
Same Expertise
Min/max Pr(δij¼ 1) Min/max Pr(δij¼ 1)
0 0.700 1.098 0.571
4 0.997 0.445 0.790
Source: Calculated by authors
Notes: All other variables, except the distance in expertise for the
effect of expertise, are fixed at their means
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describe the distortion potential. Insights about this tradeoff are valuable in order to
evaluate the potential of participatory policy processes to increase the likelihood of
improving total welfare delivering undistorted policies.
Empirical findings are presented for a case study in Malawi. Data was gathered
in face-to-face interviews with local stakeholders, international organizations, and
politicians in 2010. We find strong support for explanatory factors suggested by the
two strands of literature about determinants of communication—the preference-
driven and structure-driven models. Overall, the most influential determinants of
communication processes are an actor’s reputation, overlapping membership in
organizations and knowledge about policy impacts.
In terms of well-informed policy decisions, it is highly appreciated that knowl-
edge about policy impacts increases a sender’s probability of forming communica-
tion ties. Nevertheless, this positive result for the potential of participatory policy
processes to increase well-informed policy choices is narrowed by the high influ-
ence of homophily in reputation on the probability of forming ties. Homophily in
reputation will disable well-informed but less influential players to convey valuable
information into the policy process. Further, joining other organizations increases
the probability of communicating with elite members more than accumulating
knowledge ceteris paribus. That is, promoting membership in umbrella organiza-
tions is a means to increasing information flow between groups. As overlapping
membership in organizations relates to sharing common communication platforms,
the CAADP approach of creating working groups on priority issues to work on
policy proposals for pro-poor growth policy programs is an adequate intervention in
the communication process to increase communication opportunities among orga-
nizations. However, at time of the interview round, an effective institutional
organization of dialogue among stakeholders and between government and stake-
holders was still not implemented.
The empirical analysis also shows that the probability of forming ties does not
increase with homophily in relative interests in fundamental policy goals, e.g.,
poverty reduction via economic growth. Hence, although the identified network-
generating process clearly discriminates between types of nongovernmental orga-
nizations, it still follows that policy decisions will not be fundamentally biased in
favor of special interests. Nevertheless, policy bias might result since organizations
have different levels of political knowledge, which is not fully reflected in the
probability of sending information to powerful politicians. The latter results espe-
cially from the fact that, beyond knowledge, structural factors such as meeting
opportunities, as well as reputational homophily, determine communication ties
among organizations.
Moreover, even communication ties perfectly determined by political knowl-
edge can still result in biased policies if average level of knowledge is rather low,
i.e., political beliefs for all organizations are systematically biased. This point will
be further elaborated in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating participatory
policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi” below.
Finally, the perceived influence of organizations affects tie evolution in the elite
network. Organizations are more likely to be contacted if they are highly influential.
This finding is intuitive since organizations want to ensure that final policy
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decisions consider their knowledge about policy impacts, so that their members
benefit from implemented policies.
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